incorporate the future costs implied by stock option grants, option exercises will produce negative abnormal returns. We design and implement a stock-picking strategy based on predictions of stock-option exercise using publicly-available information. We are able to identify stocks that subsequently exhibit significant negative abnormal returns using either a CAPM or three-factor Fama-French benchmark. We also find weak evidence that the returns are more negative for firms whose earnings shocks are more persistent, as predicted in a recent theoretical model in which limited investor attention is the source of mispricing. More consistent with the notion of limited investor attention, we find our results to be stronger in months where firms issue quarterly reports which alert investors to any dilution stemming from the exercise of employee stock options.
Introduction
In the growing controversy over off-balance sheet liabilities and potentially inflated earnings reports, employee stock options take pride of place (see The Economist (2000), Byrnes (2002) , and Morgensen (2002) ). For example, the Investor Responsibility Research Center (2001) reports that just over 14% of the equity of the average S&P 500 firm has been promised to employees through stock option plans. 1 Under current US accounting rules, stock option grants are not expensed,
are not recorded on balance sheets, and are only partially reflected in diluted Earnings Per Share.
In 2003, Standard & Poor's will introduce a new data item that it terms "Core Earnings" which will expense employee stock option grants using Black-Scholes values, and major firms such as Coca-Cola and General Electric have promised to do the same to their future earnings reports. 2 The controversy over how employee stock options should be treated in accounting reports has largely neglected the question of whether market prices already account for the associated costs. If not, it should be possible to devise a profitable stock selection strategy based on public information. Jenkins (2002) states the case with much stronger language:
Myth: Failing to deduct an expense for management stock options inflated earnings and therefore stock prices. Good grief. We've been discussing this rule change for a decade now. It would be the overripe short-selling opportunity of the century if the market were somehow fooled into mispricing stocks simply because we failed to adopt a particular accounting treatment for the non-cash value of options.
To formulate a test of this hypothesis, we begin with the assumption that investors effectively disregard at least a portion of the costs of stock option grants. 3 An obvious implied trading strategy is to short or downweight firms with large amounts of employee options outstanding, but this is an incomplete strategy. The unaddressed question is exactly when do investors realize the costs of options and drive prices back to fundamentals? 4 We assume that prices do not reflect option costs until they materialize upon exercise by employees. Observe that we cannot rule out "temporary" mispricing in which the market adjusts to reflect the costs of option grants with some 1 The Economist (2000) reports that the Black-Scholes value of employee stock option grants in 1999 was just over 6% of the earnings of an average S&P 500 firm. Core and Guay (2000) document that the Black-Scholes value of employee stock options average almost 4% of the market capitalization of the average large corporation, with values at the upper end of the spectrum approaching 24%. Sanford F. Bernstein & Co estimates that if option grants had been expensed, profit growth for the S&P 500 over 1997 through 2001 would drop from 9% to 6% (see Morgensen (2002) unspecified lag. Searching for such an effect would inevitably result in data-snooping, because in hindsight there is sure to be at least one period in which option-granting firms have lower than expected returns. Indeed, Yermack (1997) and Ittner, et al (2002) find that firms tend to perform somewhat better than expected in the year following large option grants. Our contention is that if investors neglect option costs, there is no reason to expect any correction in the subsequent year since no additional information about the option grant will emerge.
A benefit of formulating the test as a trading rule is that it forces the researcher to recognize many of the constraints that an active investor would face. 5 Most importantly, we must use forecasted option exercises, rather than realized option exercises used by Carpenter and Remmers (2001) and Huddart and Lang (2002) . Their research can ascertain whether executives made welltimed trades based on their own information, but it is mute on the question of market efficiency unless the market is sluggish in its reaction to the revelation of an insider sale. 6 By contrast, we use public information to forecast future exercises and form our portfolios in anticipation of such exercises. Our experiment is thus more closely related to Field and Hanka's (2001) study of the stock price reaction to insider selling triggered by the expiry of publicly disclosed IPO share lockups.
We use the vesting of employee stock options, in addition to results documented in existing research on the decision to exercise such options (see Huddart and Lang (1996) and Heath, Huddart and Lang (1999)), to predict the year in which exercise will take place. We then test the more refined proposition that prices will reflect exercises primarily in months where the firm issues quarterly reports; such reports alert shareholders to the net effect of stock option exercises on the firm's balance sheet.
To estimate the costs of expected option exercises, we use Standard and Poor's ExecuComp data for each of the years 1996 to 2000. The reason we have such a restricted time-series is that most employee options are not fully exercisable for four years and the ExecuComp data does not begin until 1992. Despite this limitation, we estimate a reliable and negative relationship between abnormal returns and our measure of the unrecognized cost of employee stock options. Specifically, using either a portfolio "alpha" approach or the Fama and MacBeth (1973) method, we find that the results are significant at the 5% level or better for both CAPM and Fama-French abnormal 5 Core, et al (2000), Huson, et al, (2000) and Aboody, et al (2001) find some evidence that market values of equity are lower when option liabilties are greater. While these studies are consistent with the view that stock prices already incorporate option costs, they have limited power to reject the hypothesis of market efficiency. First, the regressions require that book value, earnings, and earnings forecasts provide an adaquate control for other determinants of value. Perhaps as a result of potential misspecification problems, the result that option costs are reflected in lower market value does not hold in all specifications. Second, the estimated effect of option costs on value is generaly less than one-for-one. We cannot tell if this is due to error in measuring option costs or to the market only taking partial account of stock option costs.
6 See Seyhun (1998) for an exhaustive treatment of the investment value of insider trading disclosures.
returns. Moreover, we find that the effects tend to be stronger in months when quarterly reports are issued. Obviously, our time-period is unrepresentative in that the market performed better than its historical average. However, we continue to find evidence that the market underestimates the costs of stock options even after controlling for firm fixed effects, that is, after setting each firm's expected returns equal to its average realized return over our time period 1996 to 2000.
To fix ideas, the Pepsico company serves as a convenient illustration of how our rule works.
Pepsi made large option grants in 1992 and 1994, but granted negligible numbers of options in 1993. Pepsi's stock underperformed the market in 1996 and 1998, when the large option grants were first fully vested, but outperformed the market in the intervening year 1997. Consistent with the findings of Kahle (2002) , Pepsi underperformed in 1996 even though it repurchased a large amount of its stock in order to offset the increase in shares due to option exercises. Whether such apparent employee-stock-option-induced market movements occur in a large sample of firms is the purpose of our work.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model that highlights the key measurement and accounting issues, as well as the assumptions required for our trading rule to work. Section 3 summarizes our data and how we put together our stock selection rule. Section 4 analyzes the performance of our trading rule. In Section 5 we provide further evidence on Hirshleifer and Teoh's (2002) model of limited investor attention. Section 6 presents our sensitivity analyses and Section 7 concludes. The Appendix contains the proof of our main proposition.
A Simple Model
Consider an all-equity firm with n shares outstanding plus m identical employee stock options, each with an exercise price X. The present value of the firm's future cash-flows is denoted by V . We consider two periods. The first period corresponds to the time that we make our stock selections, at which point all parties agree that V = V 0 and that firm value in the second and final period is distributed according to the distribution F (V ). In this terminal period, employees can exercise their options and will choose to do so if their options are in the money. While the results in this section hold for any distribution of terminal values, in our empirical work we will effectively assume that it is log-normal because we use the Black-Scholes-Merton formula to approximate the value of options.
Denote by P 0 the stock price at the initial period and denote the stock price in the terminal period by P 1 . If options expire out of the money, there will be only n shares outstanding so
If by contrast options expire in the money, the shareholders receive a cash infusion of mX, but must also issue m additional shares, thus P 1 (in) ≡ V +mX n+m . Denote by V * ≡ nX the critical terminal value of V at which the options are just at the money. This value is unique since
Our interest in this paper is whether the market properly anticipates the costs of stock options, so our attention is focused on the initial price P 0 . Since the expected market rate of return is assumed zero, a price that appropriately anticipates stock option costs along with the distribution of returns simply equals the expected value of the terminal price. Since the terminal price is V n if V ≤ V * and V +mX n+m otherwise, we can write the price that correctly anticipates option dilution as
Observe that an estimate of P * 0 in our model requires knowledge of the number of options granted m and the exercise price X. In practice, these values have in fact been reported at the option grant date in footnotes of annual reports since 1992. The costs are not, however, integrated into firm earnings at the grant date, nor is the evolving liability recorded on the balance sheet. An extreme view would be that the market completely ignores stock option costs, in which case the initial price would simply be given by
n . While we present evidence consistent with this view in the empirical section, we focus on the somewhat less extreme hypothesis that investors make use of the information summarized in diluted earnings per share according to SFAS 128, but do not take account of the full costs of options. SFAS 128 requires firms to recognize an additional number of shares equal to max[0,
]; see, for instance, Core, et al (2000) . Put into valuation terms, SFAS 128 assumes that if options are currently not in the money, then there is no option dilution, while if they are currently in the money, the options will be immediately exercised. 7 Following this logic we define:
Clearly, the above price does not correctly incorporate the expected cost of option exercises as is done in equation (1) . It either assumes that the options will never be exercised, or that they will always be exercised. Our purpose in this section is to derive the empirical implications of a world where investors are misled by the accounting treatment of stock options to systematically underestimate their cost. Formally, the model yields the following result.
Proposition 1
If the initial stock price is P * 0 , then the expected abnormal return on the stock is zero. However, if the initial price is P Acc 0 , the expected abnormal return is equal to
, where nP 0 is the firm's initial market capitalization and
is the unrecognized cost of a single employee stock option.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. If investors underestimate the expected costs of employee stock options, the expected abnormal return is clearly negative. This implication is a direct consequence of our assumption that P Acc and stock options are not expensed at the time they are granted, the market will overvalue firms relative to fundamental value, with greater overvaluation being associated with larger employee stock option grants. 8 An additional implication of their model that is beyond the scope of our reduced-form approach is that as the persistence of earnings increases, the greater will be the overvaluation due to employee stock options and the more negative the abnormal return will be upon exercise. We test the proposition empirically in Section 5.
Proposition 1 effectively characterizes expected returns, conditioning only on the characteristics of the stock option grant (m and X). While we report results with raw returns in our empirical section, we focus on market-adjusted returns to each stock to isolate underperformance from any correlation between stock option costs and systematic risk factors. In addition to the relationship between raw and risk-adjusted returns and option values, it is also possible to estimate expected returns conditional on observing option exercise. Such a test would not address the question of whether or not the market appropriately prices the costs of employee stock options, because employees will exercise only if V > V * . That is, we expect to see a positive relationship between employee stock option exercises and prior stock market performance, even if investors had overvalued the firm by neglecting the fact that employees will share in good stock price performance. 9 8 Hirshleifer and Teoh (2002) provide an opposite prediction for the situation in which the expected option costs are fully expensed at the time of granting, resulting in firms being undervalued. However, since current U.S. accounting standards do not require such full expensing, this prediction remains untested. 9 As emphasized earlier, prior research has documented a negative relationship between option exercises and We confirm this relationship empirically in our Table 3 , but it is of secondary interest. The more important implication of Proposition 1 is that the stocks of firms with large amounts of expected option exercise will perform worse than they otherwise would have, and operationally this means that they will underperform their market-based benchmarks.
There are two key issues that our simple two-period model does not address. The first is the choice of the initial period. This is arbitrary in the theory. To reflect accounting reality, however, we have to recognize that P Acc refers to the price at the end of the last fiscal year since this is the price that is used in computing the most recent version of diluted EPS. The second timing issue is the terminal point. In the model, the ending point is the date that the employees exercise their options. The contractual maturity of most employee stock options is 10 years. Thus, if employees behave according to risk-neutral option pricing, we would observe exercises before 2002 only for those firms that grant options with maturities less than 10 years and for those with extremely high dividend payouts. It is, however, well known that employees exercise grants soon after vesting if the option is in the money (see Huddart and Lang (1996) and Heath, Huddart and Lang (1999)).
Indeed, SFAS 123 requires firms to disclose in footnotes (not earnings) the Black-Scholes value of option grants but leaves them free to assume maturity dates far less than the contractual maturity in so doing.
Our model does not endogenize early exercise (see, e.g. Meulbroek (2001) and Hall and Murphy (2000) for models that do so based on employees' lack of diversification), but the model is consistent with this practice. We interpret V * as the level of firm value at which the employee chooses to exercise. In the real-world with early exercise, if the actual value at the end of a period before maturity falls below V * , it does not mean that the option actually expires out of the money. Rather, it means that the option remains alive, to be potentially exercised in subsequent periods. We now turn to the construction of our stock selection rule to delineate exactly how we deal with these issues.
3 Data and the Stock-Selection Procedure
Estimating the Costs of Option Exercises
Our stock selections are based on employee option information from Standard and Poor's ExecuComp, combined with market data from CRSP. ExecuComp reports key information about option subsequent stock returns, but this is most plausibly explained as reflecting employees' informational advantages and does not address the question of semi-strong-form market efficiency.
grants to executives for the S&P 1500 firms (including the S&P 500, the S&P Midcap, and the S&P Smallcap) starting in 1992. The database covers at most five executives, but also reports the percentage of total option grants in a given year represented by a given executive option grant. 10 ExecuComp also provides summary information on options granted before 1992, but only for the top five executives. We have no data on the scale of grants to all employees before that date.
For the grant data starting in 1992, we assume that other employees have options with the same exercise price as the executives, which amounts to assuming that they receive their grants at the same time. For most firms in our sample, this is sufficient. However, nearly 35% of the firms in our sample made multiple grants to the CEO and/or to other executives. We assume that employees receive grants in the same proportion as the CEO. That is, the CEO's grant is assumed to be a scale replica of the total option grant at his/her firm.
Our trading rule also requires an estimate of when employees exercise their options, and the associated costs to shareholders. Huddart and Lang (1996) and Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999) both document spikes in employee exercises at the fourth year of an option so long as it is in the money. We make our stock selections at the beginning of each year and can only use information at that time. Proposition 1 tells us that the expected negative abnormal return is just equal to the unrecognized cost of the options, scaled by the current market capitalization of the firm's equity.
To estimate the unrecognized cost we use the Black-Scholes-Merton value less the intrinsic value of the options at the end of the fiscal year. Since our selections are made for a given year, we also assume a maturity of one year in computing our Black-Scholes values. Obviously, more frequent selections would increase the power of our tests, but the underlying option data is only annual.
Below, we describe two ways in which we can at least use stock price information to update our option cost estimates more frequently than once per year.
Our exact formula for computing option costs is as follows. In 1992, we take the number, n 1992 , and exercise price of options granted, X 1992 , for each firm, and then look forward to the end of fiscal-year 1995. At this point we estimate the volatility for each firm's stock returns using the previous five years of monthly data. We compute the intrinsic value version of the dollar option cost as the maximum of zero and the difference between the stock price at the end of the firm's fiscal 1995 and the exercise price. This number, scaled by market capitalization, is 1992's contribution to diluted earnings per share computed according to SFAS 128 (see Core, Guay, and Kothari (2000)).
Our forecast of the unrecognized dollar cost of options that will be realized in 1996 computes the Black-Scholes value of options granted in 1992, valued at the end of 1995, and assumes a one-year 10 Thanks to Wayne Guay for alerting us to the presence of this data item.
maturity. More formally, for each firm we compute
where C() is the Black-Scholes-Merton formula adapted for the payment of continuous dividends, P 1995 is the stock price at the end of fiscal-year 1995, d is the dividend yield averaged over the previous five years, σ is the estimated volatility, and T = 1 is the assumed time to exercise (one year). The next term is the intrinsic option cost at the end of 1995 and MCap 1995 is the market capitalization at the end of fiscal 1995. Finally, the indicator variable L takes on the value of one if the firm had positive earnings for the year and zero otherwise. The reason is that SFAS 128 does not allow the firm to use option dilution to reduce losses per share. We call our resulting measure the unrecognized option cost to remind the reader that we are focusing on that part of option cost that is not already recognized in diluted earnings per share. Our research question is whether they are also unrecognized in market prices.
Our procedure is similar for subsequent years; we use options granted in 1993 to form our portfolios for 1997, and so forth. The difference as we move beyond 1992 is that we also track whether options granted in 1992 did in fact come into the money in 1996. If the maximum stock price in 1996 did not exceed the exercise price of options granted in 1992, we use these options as well as those granted in 1993 to compute our option cost at the end of 1996 for our portfolio choices for the year 1997. Formally, at the end of fiscal 1996 we save the maximum stock price during the fiscal year, P Max 1996 , and the associated indicator variable:
o t h e r w i s e .
We then compute the unrecognized 1997 stock option cost as
If again the 1992 options do not fall in the money, we retain them for the following year. We do not exogenously drop any options unless their maturity is exceeded, which is a rare event in our sample given the 9-year window and the fact that most options have a 10-year maturity.
The above procedure embodies an assumption that options vest in four years and that employees exercise such options in the first year they are vested and in the money. Both assumptions are only a rough approximation of reality. Some options are vested in 3 years and many vest 25% per year in each of the first four years. Our portfolio choices are not overly sensitive to the precise assumptions we make about vesting and exercise; if for example we use a three-year, rather than a four-year vesting period, the correlation between the two resulting measures of option costs is over 70%. As we demonstrate later on, our estimates are also strongly related to actual (realized) option exercises.
In an ideal world, we would update our option cost measures more frequently than once a year.
While our procedure makes full use of the annual report and proxy statement data summarized in ExecuComp, it does not fully exploit all available information within a given year. Specifically, stock price changes are available throughout the year. We construct two supplementary measures in an attempt to update our option cost figures on a monthly basis. First, for each of the months of February through December for the years 1996 to 2000, we simply recompute our estimate of the unrecognized option costs at the beginning of each month, taking account of the change in price over the previous month and of the fact that the end of the year is one month closer. Thus, for example, for February 1996 we have
This is sensible, but still makes the assumption that options are exercised only at the end of the year. While we do not have intra-year data on all stock option exercises, we can estimate the amount of option exercise if we take our model to its logical extreme. Specifically, we can assume that any negative abnormal stock performance is due to option exercise, and then take out this fraction of option cost from our forward-looking measure. Thus, if the previous month's abnormal return was positive, we use the value in (5) . If the previous month's abnormal return was negative, we set the next month's unrecognized option cost equal to (5) plus the abnormal return, or zero if the abnormal return exceeded the unrecognized option cost in absolute value. We refer to this last measure of option costs as "updated and trimmed". As we detail in the main section of the paper, neither of these two alternative approaches materially affects our results. Table 1A summarizes the raw data for the years 1996 to 2000. The first thing to note is that our sample size is smaller than might be expected with five years of returns and the 1,500 firms covered by ExecuComp. The main reason is that we must match firms' option grants with their stock return data four and more years later. To give some idea of the resulting sample selection, we tend to oversample large firms, and to undersample those firms for whom employee options are large relative to total shareholder wealth.
Descriptive statistics and calculation of abnormal returns
The option cost values in Table 1A are approximately one-third of those reported in Core and
Guay's (2001) study of employee stock options for a similar sample. The reason is that Core and Guay (2001) characterize the entire portfolio of options held by employees, and thus adds nonvested options. We focus attention on options that are at least four years old, where the options that are older than four years had not previously come into the money.
Our estimates of volatility, beta, and other factor exposures use monthly returns data for our sample period, covering the years 1996-2000. Our sample period is constrained by the fact that option grant data is not electronically available before 1992 and we have a 4-year vesting period.
Observe that it would still be possible to use historical stock return information to estimate factor sensitivities. For example, we could use data from well before 1996 to estimate exposures in 1996.
However, it is well-known (see, for example, Murphy (1999) ) that stock option grants have become increasingly important over time. Employee stock options give workers a claim on equity value that is more valuable as the value of the underlying equity increases. Thus, the shareholders' claim is more sensitive to market-wide factors in "down"-markets (when employees are unlikely to share in firm value) than in "up"-markets. The consequence is that if we were for example to use betas estimated over 1991 to 1995 for our returns in 1996, we would tend to systematically overstate the betas for firms that made heavy use of options because 1996 was an "up" market year. This would in turn lead us to falsely conclude that heavy option users underperform in "up" markets and outperform in "down" markets.
To counter this problem, we estimate our factor exposures and abnormal returns using contemporaneous data to capture the risk-effects of stock options. The beta estimates in Tables 1A and 1B come from a regression of firm-specific monthly returns minus the T-bill return on the value-weighted CRSP index returns less the T-bill return from January 1996 through December 2000, allowing the sensitivity to differ for each firm. Thus, we estimate
where ε CAP M jt is the CAPM abnormal return for firm j in month t.
We estimate exposures to the Fama-French size and market-book factors along with FamaFrench abnormal returns in a similar manner. That is,
where SMB t is the Fama-French small firm premium and HML t is the high book-to-market premium, respectively, for month t. With this approach to estimating factor sensitivities, we find that there is no longer any relationship between our estimated abnormal performance ε jt and the market premium. Table 2 presents some of the key correlations in our database using annual data. The first and most important result is that all measures of stock returns (raw, CAPM adjusted (ε CAP M ), and Fama-French adjusted (ε F F )) are negatively and significantly correlated with our unrecognized option cost measure (
There is no such relationship with the intrinsic value portion of the option's cost that is reflected in diluted earnings per share ( IntV al MCap ). There are two potential reasons why the intrinsic value portion has no relationship to subsequent stock returns. The first is that investors do correctly account for this portion of option cost, arguably because it is reflected in diluted earnings per share. The second is that investors do not correctly account for even the intrinsic value portion, but the negative subsequent returns of such overpricing are obscured by the fact that intrinsic value of 4-year old stock option grants is strongly positively related to past stock returns and the resulting momentum effect documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).
Our unrecognized option cost measure has no relationship to momentum and is in fact maximized (all else equal) when the stock price has been unchanged in the preceding four years.
The other correlations are unsurprising. High option-dilution firms tend to be smaller and have a positive exposure to the Fama-French small firm premium. They also tend to have higher betas and higher stock return volatility. The latter effect obtains not only because high-volatility firms tend to grant more options, but also because high volatility increases the unrecognized cost component of the stock option's value. While raw volatility is not a theoretically reasonable risk factor for widely traded firms, all the results below hold after controlling for its effects in addition to the more widely accepted Fama-French factors. Similarly, all our results also hold if we use dummy variables to remove the effects of 2 or 3-digit SIC industry codes.
Actual versus predicted option exercise
Our stock selection approach has two separate requirements to be successful. The first is that the market does not in fact recognize what we term "unrecognized" option dilution until it is realized.
The second is that we can adequately predict such dilution using public information and existing research. Table 3 provides some evidence on the latter requirement using hand-collected option exercise data on a subset of our firms for the years 1997 to 1999, kindly provided to us by Stuart Gillan. In the first column of results, we ask how well our rule predicts the raw number of options exercised, and in the second column we scale actual and predicted exercises by shares outstanding at the beginning of the year. We do not have data on the actual price received by employees when they exercised and so cannot check how well we predicted the total cost of exercises. Our predicted number of options exercised is equal to the number of options that we deem exercisable (at least four years past grant date and not previously in the money if more than four years past grant date), times the hedge ratio from the option pricing formula in equations (3) or (4). This automatically adjusts for both volatility and the extent to which options begin the year in the money.
The results are encouraging. Just under 40% of the variability in actual option exercises can be predicted from our estimates alone. Moreover, we can (i) reject the hypothesis that predicted option exercise is unrelated to actual exercise at better than the 1% level and (ii) cannot reject the hypothesis that actual option exercise increases one-for-one with predicted exercise at even the 10% level. We did not have strong theoretical priors for our size variable and regard it primarily as a control. The final explanatory variable is the realized stock returns over the year. At first blush it might appear that if our theory of unrecognized option costs is correct, there should be a negative relationship between actual exercises (and consequent dilution of existing shareholders) and stock returns. As indicated in the theoretical section, we expected a positive rather than a negative relationship. Our forecast of option cost is formed at the beginning of the year, while employees can condition their exercise decisions on the actual path of the stock price during the year. A run-up in the stock price also makes employee exercise more likely since it reduces the value of waiting to exercise the option. It also increases the value of exercising and selling in order to diversify their portfolios (see Meulbroek (2001) ).
Performance Estimates
We now turn to the empirical performance of our trading strategy using a portfolio approach, as well as a firm-specific analysis.
Zero-Investment Portfolios
The first test of the performance of the stock-selection rule separates firms into deciles based on our estimate of each firm's unrecognized option cost. We compute the return from taking a long position in the decile of highest-dilution firms and an offsetting short position in the decile of firms with the lowest such costs. The first and third columns of results in Table 4 indicate that if we take equal-weighted portfolios, this strategy would result in a negative return of just over 1.2 percent per month after controlling for market, size, and market-to-book factors. Moreover, the second and fourth columns show that the effects roughly double if we use value-weighted portfolios. Both results are significant at the 5% level with only 60 observations; we compute robust standard errors allowing for both heteroskedasticity and correlated errors between years because the option cost information that we use to form the portfolios is annual. Not surprisingly, the high-option cost firms have a higher market exposure (owing primarily to their higher raw volatility) and tend to load positively on the small firm factor and negatively on the high book-to-market factor.
While we use monthly returns for the results presented in Table 4 , the portfolio selections use our basic measure of unrecognized option costs from (3) or (4). We therefore select the same firms each month within a given year, which has the benefit of avoiding any hidden transaction costs, but may mask potentially useful information. However, our results are almost identical if we use either of the monthly-updating methods described in Section 3. The reason is that the intramonth changes are not generally large enough to generate large swings in the firms' rankings The reason for analyzing portfolios rather than individual stocks is to reduce noise in the estimation of factor exposures and abnormal returns. In the current application, however, there is also a significant loss of information from grouping stocks according to their unrecognized stock option costs. Much of the potential information about the effects of unrecognized option costs is contained within the highest decile where unrecognized costs range from a high of just under 11% of market capitalization to just over 1%. Put another way, our measure of unrecognized option costs is less than 1% once we enter the second decile. One way to respond is to replace the lowest decile returns in the preceding section with returns to a portfolio consisting of all stocks not in the highest decile. While the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 4 , we still lose the information contained within the highest option decile. To exploit the full range of our option cost measure, we now analyze firm-level data using the method of Fama and MacBeth (1973).
Stock-Specific Results
We begin with firm-specific abnormal returns, estimated according to equations (6) or (7) depending on whether we use CAPM or Fama-French abnormal returns, respectively. For the case of the Fama-French abnormal returns, we estimate 60 cross-sectional regressions, one for each month, as
where t ∈ [1, 60] represents a given month from January 1996 through December 2000. The first row of results in Table 5 reports the mean and standard error for the coefficient estimates ω t . The mean is negative and statistically different from zero at the 1% level using Fama-French abnormal returns, at 5% using CAPM abnormal returns, and continues to be significantly different from zero at the 10% level even if we use raw returns.
The last two columns of the first row use the two alternative monthly-updated measures of unrecognized option cost with Fama-French abnormal returns. The first updates the Black-Scholes-
Merton option values to reflect changes in the stock price and time to exercise ("updated"), and the second also assumes that the prior month's abnormal returns were all due to option exercise ("updated and trimmed"). The results are virtually identical to those with the simple estimate of option cost that is the same for all months in a given year. One reason the results do not improve despite using more information is that we are now effectively betting against the short-run momentum documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) . If returns early in the year are negative, both our updating rules imply a reduction in unrecognized option cost and thus a reduction in future underperformance. If early returns are positive, the increased option cost will further increase and we will therefore predict greater underperformance.
The results thus far consistently support the hypothesis that the unrecognized option cost is associated with subsequent underperformance. The second row of results in Table 5 tests a stronger-form hypothesis. Since our unrecognized option costs are computed as a fraction of total firm value, abnormal stock returns should be reduced one-for-one with higher option cost. While this may appear to be a precise and powerful prediction, our ability to test it is hampered by the fact that our option data are available on an annual basis only and we are only able to predict that one-for-one underperformance will take place over the course of a given year. The second row of results reported in Table 5 cumulates abnormal returns for each year and then re-estimates equation (8) on an annual basis. The average of the resulting annual coefficients is strongly negative, but the associated t-tests have only four degrees of freedom. We are unable to reject the hypothesis that the average coefficient is equal to negative one in any specification, but we are also unable to reject the hypothesis that it is zero in all but one specification.
Tests of Limited Investor Attention

Effects of Earnings Persistence
As indicated earlier, Hirshleifer and Teoh (2002) explicitly model the source of the mispricing that is the basis of our tests. Their Proposition 5 outlines two distinct predictions of how limited investor attention should affect stock returns when employee stock option costs are not expensed.
The first prediction is essentially the same as our Proposition 1 and receives empirical support from the results in the previous section. Their second prediction is that the mispricing due to employee stock options should be greater for firms in which earnings shocks are more persistent.
The intuition is that investors with limited attention extrapolate future performance from recent earnings reports, neglecting any potential dilution owing to options. Since the employees as holders of the stock options share in future value increases, the effect on misvaluation from (unrecognized) stock options is greater in firms where current earnings shocks have a larger effect on future cashflows (i.e., where earnings persistence is higher).
Hirshleifer and Teoh's (2002) persistence hypothesis implies that the estimated effects in the previous section should be amplified for firms where earnings shocks have more persistent effects.
The large accounting literature on the subject of earnings persistence guides our empirical approach in two major ways (see, for example, Freeman, et al (1982) ). First, it is important to recognize that earnings tend to grow over time so that earnings levels are not stationary. We therefore focus on departures from average earnings growth for each of our sample firms, and also follow the literature by scaling earnings by lagged assets. Second, there is a tendency for earnings to mean-revert so the average firm should have negative persistence. This is not a problem for the Hirshleifer and Teoh (2002) prediction which focuses our attention on cross-sectional variation in the degree of earnings persistence. Formally, for each firm j, we estimate earnings persistence (b p j ) for our firm-year starting in 1996 as: 1986, 1996] .
Thus, we use a rolling 10-year window of earnings changes for each firm-year. Consequently, we exclude all firms that do not have an earnings history back to at least 1986, but the results reported below are qualitatively unchanged if we instead estimate earnings persistence by industry at the two-digit SIC code level, or if we use operating cash-flow in place of earnings.
The last row of Table 1A reports summary statistics for our estimates of earnings persistence.
Consistent with the existing literature, the means and medians are negative, but more importantly for our tests, there is significant dispersion. The last row of Table 2 shows that earnings persistence has little correlation with any of our other control variables, except for some tendency for larger firms to have greater persistence.
To test the prediction that option dilution will have a greater effect on returns for firms with more persistent earnings, we repeat our tests from the previous section, distinguishing between However, it is important to recognize that while the results are statistically insignificant, the point estimates are economically nontrivial. An annualized monthly negative return of -0.017
(the average underperformance of the high-dilution subsample using value-weighted returns and controlling for Fama-French factors) translates into about -18.7% annually. Our point estimate of the difference between the high and the low persistence subsamples implies that the returns fall to -24.5% for the high-persistence subsample. Table 7 summarizes the results from estimating monthly cross-sectional regressions of returns on option costs for firms with differing degrees of earnings persistence. Hirshleifer and Teoh's (2002) model predicts that option costs should have stronger negative effects for firms with high levels of earnings persistence. Table 7 documents that the effect is indeed largest for firms in the top decile of earnings persistence, but consistent with the portfolio results in Tables 6A and 6B, the effects are not statistically significant. Specifically, the average coefficient on option cost for firms in the highest decile of earnings persistence is not statistically distinguishable from that for firms in lower deciles of persistence.
One explanation for our results is that earnings persistence does not in fact have any systematic effect on mispricing. An alternative is simply that our tests do not have sufficient power to reject the null hypothesis of no effect. First, in the Fama-Macbeth regressions in 
When does the market learn about option exercises?
Hirshleifer and Teoh's (2002) model focuses on limited investor attention as the source of misvaluation. Our trading rule effectively assumes that investors eventually pay attention to employee stock options when they are exercised and the firm must issue the shares. Table 3 indicates that our approach is successful in predicting the year in which options are exercised. In this section,
we pursue further the question of when investors learn about such exercises. Observe that the estimates in Table 3 use information about option exercises which are available only from proxy statements issued at the end of the firm's fiscal year. But while quarterly income statements and balance sheets do not separately detail option exercises, they do in fact adequately summarize their value effects. They report the current number of shares outstanding and associated EPS values, and the updated book equity values summarize the net effect of any cash paid into the company from option exercises less cash paid out to repurchase shares. Thus, if Hirshleifer and Teoh (2002) are correct that investors tend to focus on earnings and related numbers, and tend to neglect stock option information from footnotes and related sources, we should expect to find stronger results in months where quarterly reports are released.
Unlike earnings persistence, there is no error in identifying quarterly earnings months. However, the data are still less than ideal because just over 70% of our sample firms have a December fiscal year. While we have quarterly reporting in every month of the year for some firms in our sample, there is a strong clustering of reports in March, June, September, and December. However, our market and Fama-French factors should control for any market-wide monthly return regularities. Table 8A estimates the effect of reporting months in the highest decile of expected option cost.
The dependent variable in each of the regressions is the difference in returns for a portfolio of firms that have a quarterly earnings report and a portfolio of those firms that do not. The negative and generally significant intercepts indicate that our annual option cost measures have their strongest effects in months where investors receive quarterly reports. This finding lends support to our idea that investors move prices once they recognize the effect of the options.
Recall that the average monthly underperformance of the high-option cost firms is given by the intercept terms in the odd-numbered regressions in Tables 6A and 6B , and ranges from approximately -1.3% to -2.4%. Our point estimates in Table 8A of approximately -0.7% for the difference in returns between a portfolio of firms with and without quarterly reports indicate that the such reports approximately double the negative effect of option costs. This is consistent with some investors gleaning information about option exercises from sources other than quarterly reports, but a large fraction of investors reacting only when the information is summarized in earnings per share.
As noted above, firms' quarterly reports tend to cluster in the months of March, June, September, and December, and there is some tendency for such firms to be larger and to have smaller option cost levels. To exploit the full range of option cost data, Table 8B summarizes cross-sectional monthly regressions of abnormal returns on option cost, distinguishing between firms that issue and those that do not issue quarterly reports in the given month. The results are consistent with the portfolio results in Table 8B . The negative effect of option costs is substantially larger in months where there are quarterly earnings reports. In the case of Fama-French abnormal returns, the difference is statistically significant at the 10% level.
6 Additional Evidence
The Effect of Changes in Accounting Standards
Most of the current debate about accounting for stock options centers on the question of whether and how they should be expensed (see Aboody, et al (2001) , Morgensen (2002) , and Byrnes (2002)).
We cannot test for the effects of accounting regulations regarding the expensing of stock options for the simple reason that there were no major changes in regulation during our sample period. The most recent such change was in SFAS 123 which required the disclosure of the exact items that we use to construct our option cost measures. Before 1992, the necessary information was not public nor was it covered electronically in the ExecuComp database.
Our model and our empirical tests do, however, take account of SFAS 128 and its effect on diluted earnings per share. We can test for this decision's effect on the pricing of stock option liabilities because it applied only to companies whose fiscal year ended after December 1997. We begin by reintroducing our variable of intrinsic option cost from equations (3) and (4) as a separate regressor to test whether the market accurately takes account of this more tangible portion of option cost. We then create a dummy variable, denoted the F ASB Dummy, indicating that SFAS 128 was in effect, setting it equal to one for all fiscal years beginning in January 1998 and zero otherwise.
The regressions in Table 9 pool all the observations together and include controls for the FamaFrench factors allowing for firm-specific coefficients as in equation (7). To more fully ensure that features such as firm size do not drive the results, we also include direct measures of size and book-to-market values. The first column of results in Table 9 estimates the specification:
where the subscript t now refers to the years 1996 to 2000. Since the data is a pooled, cross-sectional time series, we estimate standard errors allowing for both heteroskedasticity and the possibility that errors are correlated within any given year. Consistent with the results presented in the previous section, the unrecognized option cost has a negative effect on abnormal returns that is different from zero at the 1% level. While the point estimate is less than negative one, it is not statistically different from negative one at the 10% level. There is no evidence that the market underestimates the intrinsic value portion of option cost; indeed, our estimate of the coefficient θ is greater than zero at the 5% confidence level although it is less than one-third of the effect of the unrecognized option cost in absolute value.
The next two columns of Table 9 test whether SFAS 128 had any effect on either of the above results. The second column shows that while there is some evidence that the market took greater account of the intrinsic value portion of option cost after SFAS 128 became effective, it seemed also to do so before the statement became effective. The third column allows for the possibility that the attention drawn to stock options by SFAS 128 also caused the market to take account of the unrecognized part of option costs. We find no statistical evidence that this is the case.
Our inability to identify any systematic effect of the application of SFAS 128 does not show that the accounting treatment of options is irrelevant. First, and most obviously, we could not have conducted this study without the disclosure requirements contained in the earlier decision on the expensing of earnings, SFAS 123. Second, the tests in Table 9 are essentially an event-study focusing on the date where SFAS 128 was actually in effect. As with most significant accounting decisions, the issues had been exposed and debated for some time before the issuance of the final statement. Thus, the statement was by no means a surprise and the relevant issues had already been publicly disclosed and heavily debated. A related process may be in effect with the current debate about expensing employee stock options, which has been ongoing since the issuance of SFAS 123. If this publicity and debate had led to a greater awareness of the true costs of employee stock options, we might expect our method for selecting overvalued stocks to become less powerful over time. We cannot locate any systematic evidence of this in our data, however. For example, while it is true that the monthly coefficients used for the Fama-Macbeth analysis of Table 5 are smaller in absolute value in 2000 than they are in 1996, there is no statistically significant time-trend and in fact the smallest absolute effects are found in 1999, and not in 2000.
Robustness Checks
In this final subsection, we assess the robustness of our results to omitted variables and to the presence of outliers. While our tests control for market, size, and book-to-market factors, it is still possible that we are picking up some version of some other factor. Despite appearances, it is not possible for either short-term momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)) or longer-term reversals (DeBondt and Thaler (1987)) to drive our results. The reason is that all else equal, our unrecognized option cost is greatest for firms that have had essentially flat stock prices over the prior 4 years, because the time component of the option's value is maximized when the option is just at the money. Empirically, there is no statistically significant relationship between our dilution numbers and historical six-month, twelve-month, or five-year stock performance. Nonetheless, there remains a long list of potential alternative explanations, especially given the fact that our option costs are higher for small growth firms and our tests only use the last years of the 20th century.
Moreover, our estimates of the option cost are directly related to estimates of dividend yield and volatility.
To control for the widest possible set of alternative reasons for our results, the first column of results in Table 10 control for firm fixed effects as well as our other controls. In effect, we allow each firm to have its own alpha (k j ) and restrict option costs to explaining intertemporal variations in abnormal returns by estimating:
The conclusion that unrecognized option costs are in fact unrecognized by the market until they materialize is actually strengthened by controlling for firm fixed effects, and as the third column shows, the conclusion continues to hold if we omit the Fama-French controls.
The remaining results in Table 10 address the concern that outliers in either stock returns or option costs could be driving our results by estimating median regressions, which minimize the sum of absolute errors rather than squared errors. Again, our key results are unaffected.
Concluding Remarks
One common explanation for the popularity of employee stock options as a compensation tool is their "favorable" accounting treatment, in that the accounting costs tend to understate the true economic costs. Such considerations should of course be irrelevant to a manager interested in maximizing firm value in a setting where market participants can see through the accounting treatment. Our results suggest that the stock market tends to undervalue the costs of employee stock options until such costs are realized. The aggressive use of employee stock options may thus represent a transfer of wealth from long-term to short-term shareholders. They also suggest that firms that have recently granted a large amount of employee stock options will tend to be overvalued.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Observe that realized returns are given by
, and expected returns are given by
which is identically zero if P 0 = P * 0 . Since the required return in the modelled economy is zero, expected returns equal abnormal returns. If P 0 = P Acc 0 , there are two cases to consider. Consider first the case where the options begin out of the money, so that P Acc
. In this case, expected returns can be written as
( 1 1 ) Here, U denotes the unrecognized cost of a single stock option as the difference between the value of the option if it were optimally exercised and its current intrinsic value. Since P Acc
n dF (V ) < X, this can be expressed as
In the second case where the options are currently in the money, P Acc
n+m dF (V ) and expected returns can be written as
( 1 3 ) 24
When the option begins in the money, and thus P Acc
we can write the unrecognized cost of a single stock option as the difference between the value of the option if it were optimally exercised and its current intrinsic value. We denote this value as U as estimate it as
We can therefore express the expected return as
where The betas reported in this paper use an OLS regression of raw returns on the raw returns of the CRSP value-weighted index return over 1996 to 2000. There are 10,532 observations in this sample.
Variable
Mean Median SD Min Max
Number of 4-year old Options as a % of Shares Outstanding Observe that * denotes that the correlation coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1% level, and ** denotes significance at the 5% level. "Mkt Prem" is the market risk premium, "Small Firm" is the Fama-French small firm factor, and
Mkt
Book is the market value of equity plus book values of debt and preferred stock divided by book assets. The first (third) and second (fourth) columns have as dependent variables the monthly returns of a portfolio of firms in the highest decile of unrecognized option costs minus the monthly returns of a portfolio of firms in the lowest decile of unrecognized option costs, using equal-weighted and value-weighted returns, respectively. In the first two columns, the dependent variables are regressed on the market factor, whereas in the last two columns, the dependent variables are regressed on market, small firm, and market-to-book factors. Standard errors in parentheses are Huber-White sandwich errors, allowing for heteroskedasticity and for correlated errors within years. * indicates different from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 10% level.
Variable
Equal-weighted This table contains the time-series average of coefficients from regressing returns on unrecognized option cost, over the months January 1996 to December 2000, after controlling for the Fama-French (FF) factors (columns I, IV, and V), the market (CAPM) factor (column II), and based on raw returns only (column III), respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. * indicates different from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 10% level. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the estimated annual coefficients are equal to -1 at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels for any of the specifications. The first and third columns have as dependent variables the monthly returns of a portfolio of firms in the highest decile of unrecognized option costs, using equal-weighted and value-weighted returns, respectively. The second and fourth columns use the difference between the monthly returns on a portfolio of firms in the highest decile of unrecognized cost and above median earnings persistence, versus firms in the highest decile of unrecognized option cost and below the median in earnings persistence. Standard errors in parentheses are Huber-White sandwich errors, allowing for heteroskedasticity and for correlated errors within years. * indicates different from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 10% level. The first and third columns have as dependent variables the monthly returns of a portfolio of firms in the highest decile of unrecognized option costs, using equal-weighted and value-weighted returns, respectively. The second and fourth columns use the difference between the monthly returns on a portfolio of firms in the highest decile of unrecognized cost and above median earnings persistence, versus firms in the highest decile of unrecognized option cost and the below median earnings persistence. Standard errors in parentheses are Huber-White sandwich errors, allowing for heteroskedasticity and for correlated errors within years. * indicates different from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 10% level. This table contains the time-series average of coefficients from regressing returns on unrecognized option cost, over the months January 1996 to December 2000, after controlling for the Fama-French (FF) factors (column I), the market (CAPM) factor (column II), and based on raw returns only (column III), respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. * indicates different from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 10% level. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the estimated annual coefficients are equal to -1 at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels for any of the specifications. The dependent variable in each column is the difference between the monthly returns of a portfolio of firms in the highest decile of unrecognized option costs and also in a quarterly reporting month, minus the returns of firms in the highest decile of unrecognized option costs and not in a quarterly reporting month. The first and third columns control for the market return (CAPM), whereas the second and fourth column control for all three Fama-French factors. Standard errors in parentheses are Huber-White sandwich errors, allowing for heteroskedasticity and for correlated errors within years. * indicates different from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 10% level.
Equal-weighted This table contains the time-series average of coefficients from regressing returns on unrecognized option cost, over the months January 1996 to December 2000, after controlling for the Fama-French (FF) factors (column I), the market (CAPM) factor (column II), and based on raw returns only (column III), respectively. In the first row, only monthly firm returns are included if there is no quarterly report released in that month. The second row contains only the monthly firms returns for months in which the quarterly report is released. Standard errors in parentheses. * indicates different from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 10% level. + indicates that averages are different at 10%. 
